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I. Introduction
Two types of distortions often arise in abortion
jurisprudence. The first is distortion of scientific fact. Too often
abortion opponents distort medical facts, and courts accept
those distortions as true. Take, for example, the claim that
abortion makes women depressed and suicidal.1 In fact, no
reputable study supports any such causal link.2 Nonetheless,
this unfounded assertion has been used to justify laws
requiring that women seeking abortion be provided with
certain information lest they later suffer from postabortion
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1. Infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 34–58 and accompanying text (describing studies that
find no causal link between abortion and future mental illness).
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trauma.3 In particular, some states now require that doctors
read to their abortion patients a state-scripted message
describing their pregnancy as a “whole, separate, unique living
human being.”4
Equally without scientific foundation is the claim that
morning after pills like Plan B act as abortifacients.5 They do
not. This is not my personal opinion but medical consensus.6
Nonetheless, certain corporate employers who view abortion as
a sin disregard the science and argue that it violates their
religious beliefs to provide Plan B in their company’s insurance
plan.7 Accordingly, these corporate employers argue that they
should be exempted from the new requirement that health care
plans provide morning after contraception without any
additional charges to the employee.8
The second kind of distortion that occurs in abortion
jurisprudence is that the normal doctrine does not apply.
Whether it be substantive due process, equal protection, or the
focus of this Article—the First Amendment—the rules are
different when the claim involves abortion. Thus, despite the
fact that compelling someone to articulate the government’s
ideology is anathema in free speech jurisprudence,9 courts have
upheld mandatory abortion counseling laws that force doctors
to serve as mouthpieces for the state’s viewpoint.10 Similarly,
despite the fact that for-profit corporations have never been
held to have religious rights, several courts have stayed
application of the new contraception mandate on the grounds
that it might violate the corporation’s “conscience.”11

3. See infra note 65 (reviewing state abortion counseling laws).
4. Infra note 33.
5. Infra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 116–45 and accompanying text (describing studies on
Plan B).
7. Infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 105–09 and accompanying text (discussing claims).
9. See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text (discussing compelled
speech jurisprudence).
10. Infra note 68.
11. Infra note 153.
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This abortion exceptionalism12 is problematic for women
and First Amendment jurisprudence.13 People are entitled to
their own religious beliefs but not to their own facts.14 Blatant
distortions of science ought to be rejected outright. Furthermore,
overlooking First Amendment values only when women’s
reproductive rights are at stake not only harms women but also
delegitimizes the entire jurisprudence.15
12. Cf. Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased
Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 1, 6 n.18 (2012) (“Although I am sure I did not invent this term [abortion
exceptionalism], I am not aware of any prior use of it in the legal literature.”).
13. In a blog post discussing an earlier draft of this Article, Corbin on
Abortion Distortions (and What’s Missing), PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 12, 2014),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/01/corbin-on-abortion-istortionsand-whats-missing.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review), Paul Horwitz questions why I have not addressed the
distortions of free speech jurisprudence in the other direction, particularly the
complaints of Justice Scalia and others regarding Supreme Court decisions
upholding limits on abortion protesters near abortion clinic entrances. See, e.g.,
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (upholding 8-foot buffer zone and
noting “our cases have repeatedly recognized the interests of unwilling listeners
in situations where the degree of captivity make it impractical for the unwilling
auditor . . . to avoid exposure”); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S.
753, 754 (1994) (upholding injunction imposing noise restrictions and creating
36-foot buffer zone around health clinic entrance but striking other restrictions);
cf. McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
2857 (2013) (No. 12-1168) (challenging law creating 35-foot buffer zone around
clinic entrances). To the extent these regulate speech rather than conduct, I
have discussed elsewhere how the Supreme Court abortion protester decisions
are rooted in the First Amendment captive audience doctrine. See Caroline Mala
Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 BOS. U. L.
REV. 939, 943–57 (2009) (explaining that the Free Speech Clause does not
guarantee private speakers a right to captive audiences and that the state may
regulate speakers who invade the privacy of captive audiences to an intolerable
degree).
14. See infra note 150 (discussing the statement that people are entitled to
their own beliefs).
15. These distortions are a longstanding concern. See, e.g., Christina E.
Wells, Abortion Counseling As Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of
Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724,
1724 (1995)
Contrary to Scalia’s suggestion [“that no legal rule or doctrine is safe
from ad hoc nullification by this Court when an occasion for its
application arises in a case involving state regulation of abortion”],
the First Amendment was sacrificed at the abortion altar much
earlier. In its hurry to dismantle abortion rights in the area of
abortion counseling, the Court also pulled apart the fundamental
tenets of the First Amendment . . . [in] Rust v. Sullivan and Planned
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II. The Abortion Syndrome that Wasn’t There

The alleged deleterious effect of abortion on women’s mental
health has been invoked to justify a slew of abortion restrictions.
The underlying theory is that abortion is traumatic because
mothers are severing their natural bonds and killing their unborn
child.16 This view assumes that all women are naturally inclined
to be mothers, that they bond with their pregnancy from the
earliest stages, and that they view their pregnancy as their child
rather than, for example, a collection of cells. Assuming that
abortion is a traumatic experience, state legislatures have
passed, and courts have upheld, various mandatory counseling
laws such as laws that force women to undergo an ultrasound
and listen to a detailed description of the sonographic image or
laws that require doctors to inform women that abortion ends the
life of a human being.17
In fact, the empirical studies fail to support the underlying
assumption that abortion is traumatic. Abortions do not make
women depressed or suicidal; Post Abortion Syndrome does not
exist.18 On the contrary, women who abort unwanted pregnancies
Parenthood v. Casey.
Paula E. Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Wasteland: The Exceptionalism of DoctorPatient Speech Within the Rehnquist Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 8
HEALTH MATRIX 153, 158–59 (1998) (“Both Rust and Casey are inconsistent with
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. It is now apparent that Rust and
Casey are also strikingly inconsistent with the Rehnquist Court’s own free
speech jurisprudence.”).
16. See Brenda Major et al., Abortion and Mental Health: Evaluating the
Evidence, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863, 866 (2009) (noting that one conceptual
framework is that “abortion is a uniquely traumatic experience because it
involves a human death experience . . . as well as a violation of parental instinct
and responsibility [and the] severing of maternal attachments to the unborn
child”); id. (“The view of abortion as inherently traumatic is illustrated by the
statement that ‘once a young woman is pregnant . . . it is a choice between
having a baby or having a traumatic experience.’” (quoting David C. Reardon,
Ending Abortion: Learning the Truth—Telling the Truth, AFTERABORTION.ORG
(Nov.
23,
1999),
http://afterabortion.org/1999/a-new-strategy-for-endingabortion/ (last visited Jan 30, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review))).
17. See infra notes 61–68 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory
abortion counseling laws).
18. See infra notes 37–41 (discussing studies on abortion and mental
health).
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are at no greater mental health risk than women who do not
abort their unwanted pregnancies.19 Consequently, laws foisting
unwanted information onto women in order to prevent later
trauma have no basis in science.
Courts, unfortunately, accept the false allegations. Their
willingness to turn a blind eye to scientific distortions is matched
only by their willingness to distort First Amendment
jurisprudence to uphold these abortion requirements. Among the
most egregious examples are state laws that force doctors to
speak the government’s ideological message.20 In any other
context, including the regulation of purely commercial speech, the
state compelling private speakers to recite the government’s
ideology would be considered a paradigmatic free speech
violation.21 In the abortion context, however, the rules are
different.
A. The Scientific Distortion
The assumption that abortion tends to traumatize women,
and that consequently women need protection from their decision
to abort, crops up regularly. For example, in upholding a federal
law that banned a certain abortion procedure, Justice Kennedy
suggested that the ban advanced women’s health.22 It protected
19. See, e.g., APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION, REPORT
OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2 (2008) [hereinafter APA TASK FORCE] (“[T]he prevalence of mental health

problems observed among women in the United States who had a single legal
first-trimester abortion for nontherapeutic reasons was consistent with
normative rates of comparable mental health problems in the general
population of women in the United States.”).
20. Infra notes 87–95 and accompanying text.
21. Note that these laws apply to all doctors, not just government funded
doctors as in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
22. The law was challenged because it banned an abortion procedure
without making any exception for women’s health. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 143 (2007). Up until this decision, the Supreme Court only allowed
abortion restrictions if the law provided that the restrictions did not apply if
they would jeopardize women’s health. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
931 (2000) (noting that “a State may promote but not endanger a woman’s
health when it regulates the methods of abortion”). Here, no such exception was
made. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 166. The procedure was banned even if it might
actually be safer than the ones still allowed. Id. at 161–67. How a law with no
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women not because the banned procedure was physically
dangerous; in fact, he acknowledged that it might actually be
safer than the alternatives.23 Rather, it advanced women’s health
because women might undergo the procedure without fully
understanding its mental health aftermath.24 Explaining, Justice
Kennedy first assumes that pregnant women always have a
strong maternal bond: “Respect for human life finds an ultimate
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child.”25 He
next assumes that women may well suffer from their abortion
decision: “While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women
come to regret their choice to abort the infant they once created
and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.”26
exception to protect women’s health advances women’s health is, of course,
something of a mystery.
23. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 161–64 (noting that while some medical
experts disagree, acknowledging that “[t]he District Court for the District of
Nebraska concluded ‘the banned procedure is, sometimes, the safest abortion
procedure to preserve the health of women.’ The District Court for the Northern
District of California reached a similar conclusion”).
24. Id. at 159.
25. Id. This assumption that all women have a natural propensity towards
motherhood is echoed in the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, the
findings of which were incorporated into law: “The pregnant mother, in virtually
every instance, considers having an abortion because she, or others in her life,
believes that her circumstances render the timing of motherhood—not
motherhood itself—inconvenient or undesirable.” S.D. TASK FORCE TO STUDY
ABORTION, REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION 34
(2005) [hereinafter S.D. TASK FORCE].
26. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159. Justice Kennedy then suggests that doctors
will shy away from telling women the gruesome details of this abortion
procedure. See id. (“In a decision so fraught with emotional consequences some
doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means that will be used,
confining themselves to the required statement of risks the procedure entails.”).
As a result, women, to the detriment of their mental health, may only fully
understand what they have done after the fact. See id. at 183–84 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“Because of women’s fragile emotional state and because of the
‘bond of love the mother has for her child,’ the Court worries, doctors may
withhold information about the nature of the intact D & E procedure.”). In
dissent, Justice Ginsburg points out that if the problem is lack of information,
the solution should be providing information, not banning a potentially safer
procedure. See id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The solution the Court
approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and
adequately, of the different procedures and their attendant risks. . . . Instead,
the Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at
the expense of their safety.” (citation omitted)).
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This passage—which explicitly concedes the lack of scientific
evidence—is often cited to justify various “informed consent”
requirements that would not be warranted in other medical
contexts.27
At least Justice Kennedy admitted he did not have evidence
to back up his assumptions.28 Legislatures across the country
have been more assured in declaring that these laws are needed
to protect women’s mental wellbeing.29 For example, in justifying
its mandatory abortion counseling law, South Dakota concluded
that “a minimum of 10–20% of women experience adverse,
prolonged, post-abortion reactions.”30 According to South Dakota,
women who have an abortion suffer from guilt, postabortion
anger and resentment, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder,
psychological numbing, depression, suicide ideation, substance
abuse, relationship problems, and parenting difficulties.31 In
short, the psychological harm of discovering after the fact that
“she [has] killed her child is often devastating.”32 To stave off this
parade of horribles, women must learn about the enormity of the
abortion act and its attendant risks. Specifically, doctors in South
Dakota must tell their abortion patients that they are about to
“terminate the life of whole, separate, unique living human
being” and that abortion increases their risk of suicide and
suicide ideation.33
27. See infra notes 62–68 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory
abortion counseling laws).
28. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no
reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created
and sustained.” (italics added)).
29. See S.D. TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 47–48
The Task Force finds that it is simply unrealistic to expect that a
pregnant mother is capable of being involved in the termination of
the life of her own child without risk of suffering significant
psychological trauma and distress. To do so is beyond the normal,
natural, and healthy capability of a woman whose natural instincts
are to protect and nurture her child.
30. Id. at 42. The study continues: “This translates into at least 130,000 to
260,000 new cases of serious mental health problems each year in the U.S.” Id.
31. Id. at 43–46.
32. Id. at 47.
33. Id. at 10 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2013)); id.
§ 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii).
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The problem is that abortion does not in fact undermine
women’s mental health. There is no Post Abortion Syndrome.34
Abortion does not increase women’s risk of depression or
suicide.35 All the most sound studies show that in terms of mental
health, women who abort unwanted pregnancies fare no worse
than women who bring their unwanted pregnancies to term.36
Every literature review of the empirical studies arrives at the
same conclusion: abortion does not cause mental health
problems.37 Here’s a sampling:
34. See Nada L. Stotland, The Myth of the Abortion Trauma Syndrome, 268
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2078, 2078 (1992) (“This is an article about a medical
syndrome that does not exist.”).
35. See, e.g., id. at 2079 (noting a study where of the 207 women
questioned, “94% reported that their mental health improved or remained the
same after [having an] abortion”).
36. In fact, preliminary results from one study that compared women
seeking abortions who obtained them to women seeking abortions who were
turned away found that the women who were denied abortions fared more
poorly in terms of their physical health and economic stability. Joshua Lang,
What Happens to Women Who Are Denied Abortions?, N.Y. TIMES (June 12,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/magazine/study-women-denied-abor
tions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (reporting on the
Turnaway Study) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For
example, “women denied abortion were three times as likely to end up below the
federal poverty line two years later.” Id.
37. The sole literature review to the contrary, Priscilla K. Coleman,
Abortion and Mental Health: Quantitative Synthesis and Analysis of Research
Published 1995–2009, 199 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 180 (2011), has been roundly
criticized in a way none of the others has been. For example, a review by the
Royal College of Psychiatrists found that “[a] number of methodological
problems with the meta-analysis conducted in the Coleman review have been
identified, which brings into question both the results and the conclusions.”
NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH AT THE ROYAL COLL. OF
PSYCHIATRISTS, INDUCED ABORTION AND MENTAL HEALTH: A SYSTEMIC REVIEW OF
THE MENTAL HEALTH OUTCOMES OF INDUCED ABORTION, INCLUDING THEIR
PREVALENCE AND ASSOCIATED FACTORS 18 (2011) [hereinafter ROYAL COLLEGE OF
PSYCHIATRISTS REVIEW]. A review by Julia R. Steinberg et al., Fatal Flaws in a
Recent Meta-Analysis on Abortion and Mental Health, 86 CONTRACEPTION 430
(2012), identifies some of them. One is violating the guidelines for conducting a
meta-analysis, including making sure there is no conflict of interest in choosing
the relevant studies. Id. at 431. Half the studies included in the Coleman metaanalysis were the author’s own. Id. When deciding whether to include a study,
there should have been an independent assessment. That did not occur. Id. A
related issue was that Coleman included many studies with highly flawed
methodology: “13 of the 23 studies (one paper included two studies) included by
Coleman did not even merit inclusion in the [Royal College of Psychiatrists
Review] because they were lower than very poor quality.” Id. at 436. This review
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The American Psychology Association Task Force on
Mental Health and Abortion concluded, after reviewing
empirical studies published in English in peer review
journals: “The best scientific evidence published indicates
that among adult women who have an unplanned
pregnancy the relative risk of mental health problems is
no greater if they have a single elective first-trimester
abortion than if they deliver that pregnancy.”38
Reviewing studies on the long-term mental health effects
of abortion, scientists at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School
of Public Health concluded: “A clear trend emerges from
this systematic review: the highest quality studies had
findings that were mostly neutral, suggesting few, if any,
differences between women who had abortions and their
respective comparison groups in terms of mental health
sequelae.”39
After reviewing the relevant empirical studies, a group of
doctors wrote in the Harvard Review of Psychiatry: “The
most well controlled studies continue to demonstrate that
there is no convincing evidence that induced abortion of an
unwanted pregnancy is per se a significant risk factor for
psychiatric illness.”40
In their study for the U.K. Academy of Medical Royal
Colleges, the National Collaborating Centre for Mental
Health and the Royal College of Psychiatrists concluded
that the best available evidence showed that “rates of

then concludes that “[l]ike others, we strongly question the quality of this metaanalysis of 22 papers just as the reliability, validity, and replicability of some of
the studies in the meta-analysis have been questioned.” Id. at 430. Or, put more
pointedly, “[a] meta-analysis cannot be used to make good science out of (mostly)
bad science.” Id. at 436.
38. APA TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 1. The Task Force reaffirmed their
finding in a published study. See Major et al., supra note 16, at 863 (“The most
rigorous studies indicated that within the United States, the relative risk of
mental health problems among adult women who have a single, legal, firsttrimester abortion of an unwanted pregnancy is no greater than the risk among
women who deliver an unwanted pregnancy.”).
39. Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and Long-Term Mental Health
Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 CONTRACEPTION 436, 436
(2008).
40. Gail Erlick Robinson et al., Is There an “Abortion Trauma Syndrome”?
Critiquing the Evidence, 17 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 268, 276 (2009).

1184

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175 (2014)

mental health problems for women with unwanted
pregnancy were the same whether they had an abortion or
gave birth.”41
Studies that find otherwise suffer from serious
methodological flaws.42 One of the most common flaws is the lack
of an appropriate comparison group.43 “Several studies compared
women who had an abortion with women who carried their
pregnancy to term without accounting for pregnancy intention.”44
Comparing women with unwanted pregnancies to women with
wanted pregnancies is essentially comparing apples to oranges.45
It makes it impossible to discern whether postabortion outcomes
are attributable to the abortion or to the unwanted pregnancy.46
Well-designed studies, in other words, must control for
wantedness versus unwantedness.47
Well-designed studies also control for other co-occurring and
confounding variables, such as prior mental health or exposure to
violence.48 It is impossible to conclude that an abortion caused
41. ROYAL COLLEGE OF PSYCHIATRISTS REVIEW, supra note 37, at 8.
42. See Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 276 (“To date, the published
studies concluding that abortion causes psychiatric illness have numerous
methodological problems . . . .”).
43. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438 (“Having an appropriate
comparison group is critical to disaggregating the impact of abortion as opposed
to other key factors and confounders.”); Major et al., supra note 16, at 865 (“It is
not appropriate to compare women who have had an abortion with women who
have never been pregnant, or with women who have given birth to a wanted
child.”).
44. Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438; see also Major et al., supra note
16, at 870 (“Controlling for the ‘wantedness’ of pregnancy is particularly
important.”).
45. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438 (“Women who have an
unintended pregnancy may be very different than women who have an intended
pregnancy and may be predisposed to different mental health outcomes
regardless of undergoing an abortion experience.”); Robinson et al., supra note
40, at 270 (“Women with unwanted pregnancies are more likely to suffer from a
number of co-occurring life stressors, including childhood adversity, relationship
problems, exposure to violence, financial problems, and poor coping capacity, all
of which contribute to emotional distress.”).
46. See Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 272 (“The effects of abortion are
often confounded with the effects of an unwanted pregnancy.”).
47. See id. at 270 (“At a minimum, the appropriate comparison group for
assessing relative risks of negative mental health outcomes of . . . abortions is
women who carry unwanted pregnancies to term.”).
48. See ROYAL COLLEGE OF PSYCHIATRISTS REVIEW, supra note 37, at 7
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mental health problems without knowing whether those problems
predated the abortion.49 Yet, studies that claim to establish this
link generally fail to measure pre-existing mental health issues.50
Indeed, the single best predictor of mental health problems after
an abortion is mental health problems before the abortion.51
In sum, “mental health problems that develop after an
abortion may not be caused by the procedure itself, but instead
may reflect other factors associated with having an unwanted
pregnancy or antecedent factors unrelated to either pregnancy or
abortion, such as . . . intimate-partner violence.”52 The failure to
control for these alternate explanations “would likely result in

(“Failing to properly take into account important factors (such as previous
mental health problems, whether the pregnancy was wanted or not, intimate
partner violence and abuse) in many studies limits our understanding of the
complex relationships between unwanted pregnancy, abortion, birth, and
mental health.”); Major et al., supra note 16, at 871 (“Most studies did not
adequately measure or control for co-occurring risks or confounding variables.”).
49. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438 (“Adjusting for prepregnancy
mental health, which is a major predictor of current and future mental health,
is critical to isolating the effects of abortion on mental health.”).
50. See, e.g., Nada L. Stotland, Induced Abortion and Adolescent Mental
Health, 23 CURRENT OPINION IN OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 340, 341 (2011)
(“Prominent among the methodological flaws of studies claiming negative
psychiatric effects are . . . the absence of any, or any meaningful, data on the
baseline, or preabortion, mental health of the patients . . . .”); cf. Trine MunkOlsen et al., Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk of Mental Disorder, 364
N. ENGL. J. MED. 332, 337 (2011) (“We found that the rate of a psychiatric
contact differed appreciably between girls and women who had an abortion and
girls and women who gave birth, even before the abortion or birth occurred.”).
51. See ROYAL COLLEGE OF PSYCHIATRISTS REVIEW, supra note 37, at 8
(concluding that the best available evidence showed that “[t]he most reliable
predictor of post-abortion mental health problems was having a history of
mental health problems before the abortion”); APA TASK FORCE, supra note 18,
at 2 (“Across studies, prior mental health emerged as the strongest predictor of
postabortion mental health.”); Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 270 (“Many
studies attribute post-abortion mental states to the abortion experience without
providing adequate control for pre-abortion mental states—even though the
literature suggests that previous psychiatric history is the most consistent
predictor of psychiatric disorders following abortion.”).
52. Major et al., supra note 16, at 863; see also Robinson et al., supra note
40, at 270–71 (“Studies that do not take into account preexisting or co-occurring
stressful circumstances in the lives of women having abortions may attribute
distress to the abortion when it is actually due to those other circumstances.”).
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spurious associations.”53 Furthermore, it leads to ignoring the
actual causes of women’s mental distress.54
These are only a couple of methodological shortcomings that
mar the studies claiming that abortion causes mental health
problems. Additional ones include sampling bias,55 poor outcome
measurement,56 and interpretation problems,57 among others.58
Not surprisingly, scientists regularly urge that policy not be
based on flawed science.59 In particular, they advise that
53. Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438.
54. See Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 277
It should also be remembered that the best predictor of mental
disorder after an abortion is a pre existing mental disorder, which is
strongly associated with exposure to sexual abuse and intimate
violence; to ignore these factors would be potentially to ignore the
actual causes of women’s distress following an abortion.
55. For example, selecting women who belong to post-abortion support
groups. Major et al., supra note 16, at 871. Another example: “[i]n a country
which only allows women with health problems or traumatic sexual histories to
access abortion, comparing the mental health of aborting women with
nonaborting women may produce spurious associations.” Charles et al., supra
note 39, at 438.
56. An example of this is the failure to use a valid, reliable, clinically
relevant measure of mental health. Major et al., supra note 16, at 872.
Alternately, many studies focus only on negative mental health outcomes:
“Assessing the clinical significance of abortion, as with any medical procedure,
requires asking ‘What is the benefit?’ as well as ‘What is the harm?’ of the
procedure compared with relevant alternatives.” Id. at 872.
57. See Major et al., supra note 16, at 438 (“The most frequent
interpretation problem encountered was the inference of causation from
correlational data.”); Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438 (noting that conflating
correlation with causation as a methodological flaw present in abortion studies).
58. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438, 446 (rating studies based on
(1) appropriateness of comparison groups; (2) control for preabortion mental
health status; (3) confounder control; (4) mental health measurement;
(5) selection bias; (6) information bias; and (7) conflating correlation with
causation and finding that out of 19, none were excellent, 4 were very good, 8
were fair, 8 were poor, and 1 was very poor); Major et al., supra note 16, at 884
Our review revealed that major methodological problems pervade
most of the literature on abortion and mental health. These include
(a) use of inappropriate comparison or contrast groups; (b) inadequate
control for co-occuring risk factors/potential confounders; (c) sampling
bias; (d) inadequate measurement of reproductive history,
underspecification of abortion context, and problems associated with
underreporting; (e) attribution; (f) poor measurement of mental
health outcomes and failure to consider clinical significance;
(g) statistical errors; (h) interpretation errors.
59. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 449 (“Programs and policies based
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mandatory abortion counseling laws be rescinded.60 “If the goal is
to help women, we are obligated to base program and policy
recommendations on the best science, rather than using science
to advance a political agenda.”61
B. The First Amendment Distortion
Despite the lack of any solid scientific evidence supporting
claims that women need supplemental information to avoid
abortion trauma, state after state has passed laws forcing doctors
to tell women a range of information about their procedure.62
While the doctrine of informed consent already requires doctors
to tell patients about the material medical risks of a proposed
on claims derived from flawed research should be modified to reflect the most
scientifically sound literature.”); Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 276 (“To date,
the published studies concluding that abortion causes psychiatric illness have
numerous methodological problems; since their conclusions are questionable,
they should not be used as a basis for public policy.”).
60. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 449 (“[E]nforcement of so-called
‘informed consent’ laws (which often provide misinformation regarding mental
health risks of abortion) is unwarranted based on the current state of the
evidence.”).
61. Id. at 449. The irony is that it may be the abortion counseling, rather
than the abortion itself, which increases the risk of women’s mental distress.
In one of the few experimental studies related to abortion, Mueller
and Major found that increasing a women’s belief in her ability to
deal with having an abortion decreased her likelihood of experiencing
depressive symptoms following abortion. Such findings suggest that
insofar as inaccurate “informed consent scripts” undermine a
woman’s belief in her ability to cope after an abortion, they may
contribute to her risk for depression.
Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 271.
62. See, e.g., GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND
WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION (2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/
spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (providing a table of various state requirements);
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND
(2014) (providing a table of state ultrasound requirements). Did the scientific
distortion lead to the jurisprudential distortion? In other words, would getting
the science right make a difference? Perhaps not, especially if, as it appears to
be the case, the real point of the laws is not to protect women but to stop
abortion. But the claim that these laws are meant to inform and help women—
they are usually called Women’s Right to Know laws—does give cover for this
goal. See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict
and the Spread of Women-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641
(2008).
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procedure and its alternatives,63 the mandated requirements go
far beyond providing that medical information. Instead, as
encouraged by the Supreme Court, they are calculated to
convince women to choose childbirth over abortion.64 In South
Dakota, doctors must tell any woman seeking to end her
pregnancy that an abortion will “terminate the life of a whole,
separate, unique living human being” and that “the pregnant
woman has an existing relationship with that unborn human
being.”65 Doctors have challenged these laws as violating their
free speech rights.66 Under normal free speech jurisprudence,
these content-based requirements would be subject to strict

63. See AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS § 8.08 (2012) (“The physician’s
obligation is to present the medical facts accurately to the patient . . . in
accordance with good medical practice.”).
64. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992)
(“[W]e permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the
unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and
informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth
over abortion.”).
65. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-10.1(1)(b)–(c) (2013). North Dakota has
added a nearly identical requirement. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.102(11)(a)(2) (2013) (requiring that women who seek an abortion be told orally
and in writing that “[t]he abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being”); see also, e.g., IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(E)
(2013) (requiring that physicians inform abortion patients that “human physical
life begins when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm”); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-6709(b)(5) (2013) (requiring the physician to inform the woman in
writing that “the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique,
living human being”); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.027.1(2) (2013) (requiring the
physician to provide printed material stating that the “life of each human being
begins at conception” and that an “[a]bortion will terminate the life of a
separate, unique, living human being”).
66. See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726–28 (8th
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (challenging the requirement that doctors inform women
that they are about to “terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique living
human being”); see also Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889,
893–94 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (challenging requirement that doctors inform
abortion patients of “all known medical risks of the procedure and statistically
significant risk factors” including an “increased risk of suicide ideation and
suicide”).
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scrutiny and almost certainly struck down.67 That, however, is
not what has happened.68
The Free Speech Clause protects the right to speak as well as
the right to not speak.69 This right against compelled speech was
first established in a case challenging a state requirement that
schoolchildren recite the pledge of allegiance every morning.70 In
striking down the law, the Supreme Court famously observed: “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, shall prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or action their faith
therein.”71 In other words, the government cannot compel anyone
to express agreement with government ideology. Such compulsion
would violate the freedom of conscience the Free Speech Clause
was designed to protect.72 It is as anathema as the state
censoring speech it disapproves.73
Consequently, any time the government regulates the
content of a person’s speech, whether by prohibiting it or
67. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (noting
that content-based speech regulations are generally subject to strict scrutiny);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 118 (1991) (same).
68. See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 738 (“We conclude that the district court erred
in granting a preliminary injunction based on Planned Parenthood’s claim that
the Act violates physicians’ First Amendment Rights.”); Rounds, 686 F.3d at 906
(“On its face, the suicide advisory presents neither an undue burden on abortion
rights nor a violation of physicians’ free speech rights.”).
69. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[F]reedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment . . . includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”); see also Hurley v. Irish–
Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (explaining
that the First Amendment protects the right to decide what to say and what not
to say).
70. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 628–30 (1943).
71. Id. at 642.
72. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977) (“[A]t
the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free
to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by
his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.”).
73. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
162 (1973) (“[I]t is anathema to the First Amendment to allow Government any
role of censorship over newspapers, magazines, books, art, music, TV,
radio . . . .”).
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compelling it, the default rule is that the regulation is
unconstitutional unless it survives strict scrutiny.74 Speech laws
that control not just the subject matter but viewpoint are
especially suspect, and especially unlikely to pass such exacting
scrutiny.75 Imagine, for example, a law forbidding obstetriciangynecologists from telling their patients about various child
support or social services available to pregnant or parenting
women.76 Or, imagine that the government compelled doctors to
advise pregnant women with two or more children to choose
abortion given the overwhelming expense of putting three
children through college.
In the mandatory abortion counseling cases, however, the
appeals courts have not applied strict scrutiny.77 Instead, they
74. See supra note 67 (referring to cases that require the application of
strict scrutiny in content-based restrictions); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”). This
does assume that the government is regulating speech as opposed to regulating
conduct that incidentally affects speech. It also assumes that, as here, the
government is regulating private speech and not its own speech.
75. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995)
When the government targets not subject matter, but particular
views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus
an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology
or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
[regulation].
(citations omitted); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386 (holding that even for unprotected
categories of speech, “[t]he government may not regulate use based on
hostilityor favoritismtowards the underlying message expressed”).
76. South Dakota is one of many states that require that doctors provide
this type of information to their abortion patients. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 3423A-10.1 (2)(a)–(c) (2013).
77. See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (finding no need to apply strict scrutiny when physicians
are “required to give truthful nonmisleading information relevant to the
patient’s decision to have an abortion” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992))); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686
F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“[T]o succeed under either its undue
burden or compelled speech claims, [the plaintiff] must show that the disclosure
at issue ‘is either [sic] untruthful, misleading or not relevant to the patient’s
decision to have an abortion.’”) (citation omitted); Tex. Med. Providers
Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding
that informed consent laws “are part of the state’s reasonable regulation of
medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of compelling ‘ideological’
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dodge the doctors’ free speech claims by applying the Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey78 undue
burden test—a test designed to protect women’s substantive due
process right to abortion.79 Casey rejected a substantive due
process challenge to the requirement that doctors inform patients
about probable gestational age80 as well as the availability of
printed materials on various social services81 on the grounds that
such “truthful and not misleading” information did not impose an
undue burden on women’s abortion rights.82 In analyzing doctors’
free speech claims, appellate courts have applied the same test
and upheld informed consent requirements deemed “truthful and
not misleading.”83 A doctor’s right to control her speech would
seem quite distinct from a patient’s right to control her
reproduction. Nonetheless, these physicians’ free speech claims

speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny”).
78. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
79. After Casey, abortion regulations are not unconstitutional unless they
impose an undue burden on women who wish to terminate their pregnancy. Id.
at 876–77. It is possible (though not necessary) to read Casey as finding that
mandatory counseling does not impose an undue burden as long as the
information conveyed is “truthful and not misleading.” Id. at 882. Information
about the probable gestational age of the fetus—the information mandated in
Casey—met those requirements. Id. at 967–98 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 881 (majority opinion).
81. See id. (describing “printed materials published by the State . . .
providing information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about
child support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and
other services as alternatives to abortion”).
82. See id. at 882 (“If the information the State requires to be made
available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be
permissible.”).
83. See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 905–06 (8th
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (upholding law compelling physicians to disclose that the
relative risk of suicide is higher for women who abort on the grounds that the
disclosure was truthful and nonmisleading); Tex. Med. Providers Performing
Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 574–80 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying Casey’s
undue burden standard and then finding permissible an informed consent law
compelling physicians “to take and display sonogram images of [the woman’s]
fetus, make audible its heartbeat, and explain to her the results of both exams”);
Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–36 (8th Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (upholding a statute compelling physicians to tell patients that an
abortion “terminate[s] the life of a whole, separate, unique human being”
because the disclosure is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to the patient’s
decision to have an abortion).
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are subject to the undue burden test rather than the more
exacting scrutiny compelled speech claims usually trigger.84
It might be argued that physician speech merits less scrutiny
than the typical compelled speech claim because mandatory
abortion counseling is part and parcel of the regulation of
medicine, and therefore more akin to regulating conduct than
speech.85 After all, Casey did note that “[t]o be sure, the
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated,
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State.”86
But in order for abortion counseling laws to be considered
regulation of medicine, they have to comport with actual medical
practice.87 Most mandatory counseling does not.88 Proper
informed consent, where patients learn about the proposed
procedure and its alternatives, consists of accurate, material,
medical information.89 Even apart from the inaccurate or
84. Supra note 83 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and A Woman’s
Right to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45
CONN. L. REV. 595, 634–40 (2012) (arguing that it should not be surprising that
a lower standard of review would be applied in the medical context because of
the state’s role in the regulation of the medical profession); cf. Katharine
McCarthy, Case Note, Conant v. Walters: A Misapplication of Free Speech
Rights in the Doctor–Patient Relationship, 56 ME. L. REV. 447, 464–65 (2004)
(arguing that “the states retain the power to regulate the professional conduct of
physicians, even when speech may be used to carry the conduct out” and
therefore states can require physicians to provide or not provide information to
patients).
86. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(citations omitted).
87. See Robert Post, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture, Informed Consent
to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 952–53 (arguing that although “constitutional protections
accorded to professional speech differ from the constitutional protections
accorded to other forms of speech . . . the category of professional [medical]
speech can be determined only by reference to the legitimate practice of
medicine”).
88. See id. at 959–60 (arguing that informed consent laws such as in South
Dakota do not address medical facts but instead compel ideological speech).
89. See, e.g., AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS § 8.08 (2012) (noting that “[t]he
physician’s obligation is to present the medical facts accurately to the patient”);
Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling
Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 69
(2012) (“The professional obligation of informed consent . . . require[s] that
accurate and material information about risks, benefits, and alternatives be
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misleading disclosures,90 requiring doctors to tell a patient that
her unwanted pregnancy is “a whole, separate, unique living
human being” and that she “has an existing relationship with
that unborn human being” is not medicine but ideology.91 The
Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the language on its own
“certainly may be read to make a point in the debate on the ethics
of abortion,” but held that it was ultimately scientific and not
ideological because the statute defined “human being” as “an
individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens.”92 But of
disclosed to all patients.”).
90. For example, six states (Arizona, Kansas, North Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, West Virginia) require that women be informed (incorrectly) that
abortion harms future fertility while five states (Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, Texas) require that women be told (incorrectly) that abortion
increases the risk of breast cancer. See GUTTMACHER, supra note 62, at 2
(providing a table of state laws). Meanwhile, South Dakota, among other states,
also requires that doctors tell their abortion patients about the “increased risk of
suicide and suicide ideation.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2013).
As discussed above, no reputable study establishes that abortion itself increases
the risk of suicide. Supra notes 16–46 and accompanying text. The Eighth
Circuit nonetheless upheld the disclosure on the grounds that it was merely
signaling correlation rather than causation. Planned Parenthood Minn. v.
Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 904–05 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
91. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 744 (8th
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the language is
“neither a medical statement nor a fact which medical doctors are trained to
address, but rather an ‘ideological pronouncement’”); Caitlin E. Borgmann,
Judicial Evasion and Disingenuous Legislative Appeals to Science in the
Abortion Controversy, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 40 (2008) (arguing that the state is
sending the message “that the embryo or fetus is morally equivalent to a child,
that the pregnant woman is already the ‘mother’ of that child, and that to
proceed with the abortion would be to murder her own child”); Caroline Mala
Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 939, 1006–07 (2009) (“[T]he state-dictated message to pregnant women in
South Dakota is not that her embryo belongs to the species Homo sapiens but
that she is killing a member of the human race who deserves to live.”); Post,
supra note 87, at 956
Whether the fetus is a ‘human being’ is . . . understood by all sides to
the abortion controversy to be an essentially contested moral
proposition. For South Dakota to require a physician to “inform” his
patient that she will be terminating the life of a “human being” is
consequently not innocent. It deliberately and provocatively
incorporates the language of ideological controversy and forces
physicians to affirm the side of those who oppose abortion.
92. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735–36 (majority opinion) (quoting S.D. HB 1166
§ 8(4)). Thus, the only medical information conveyed is that the woman is
pregnant with a member of the species Homo sapiens.
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course pregnant women already know they are carrying humans
and not pandas.93 Thus, the mandatory abortion counseling is not
providing any material medical information. Instead, it expresses
the government’s view of abortion. Conveying the government’s
moral stance on abortion is simply not part of medical practice.
To the contrary, among the doctor’s professional and ethical
obligations
is
to
respect
her
patient’s
autonomous
decisionmaking94 and provide her patient with the (relevant,
accurate, nonmisleading) medical information she needs to make
her own decisions.95
In short, contrary to fundamental free speech principles, the
government is permitted to force private individuals to convey its
ideological message. This compulsion not only violates physicians’
free speech but also results in an incoherent free speech
jurisprudence. If free speech protection is supposed to do
anything, it is supposed to prevent imposition of government
orthodoxy. Yet mandatory abortion counseling does just that: it
forces doctors to fall into line with state orthodoxy regarding
abortion.
II. The Abortion that Wasn’t There
While the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s96
individual mandate was the center of attention during the first
round of constitutional challenges to it,97 the “contraception
93. See Borgmann, supra note 91, at 38–39 (“To accept the South Dakota
legislature’s findings as scientific fact is to make the absurd suggestion that
pregnant women do not know that the embryo or fetus they are carrying is of
the human species.”); Corbin, supra note 91, at 1006 (“[U]nless the legislature
feared that women might think they are carrying dolphins or pandas instead of
Homo sapiens, the statement clearly has a moral message.”).
94. See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986). The main ethical requirements of
physicians towards their patients involve (1) respect for patient autonomy;
(2) beneficence or non-maleficence (“do no harm”); and (3) justice. Id. at 5.
95. Supra note 89; see also AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS § 8.08 (2012) (noting
that “[t]he patient should make his or her own determination about treatment”).
96. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
97. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012)
(addressing the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
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mandate” is fast becoming the star of another round of
challenges, this time on religious liberty grounds.98 Under the
landmark health care law, large employers99 must now provide
their employees with health insurance that covers basic
preventive care.100 For women, basic preventive care encompasses
access to FDA-approved contraception,101 including “morning
after” pills such as Plan B and Ella.102
Among those bringing religious liberty claims are large, forprofit corporations and their devout owners who view abortion as
equivalent to murder.103 They argue that to facilitate this sin in
any way, even by owning a corporation whose health insurance
plan covers abortifacients like Plan B and Ella, contravenes their
deeply held faith.104
Act’s individual mandate).
98. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2713(a)(4), 124 Stat. 119,
131 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012)).
99. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2012) (defining “applicable large
employer” specifically as an employer with “an average of at least 50 full-time
employees during the preceding calendar year”).
100. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2713(a)(4), 124 Stat.
119, 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012)).
101. See 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R.
§ 54) (noting that the preventive care services included are supported by the
Health Resources and Services Administration guidelines, which require
coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptive methods).
102. See Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/ucm313215.htm (last
updated Aug. 27, 2013) (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (listing Plan B and Ella as
methods of emergency contraception) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); FDA News Release: FDA Approves Ella Tablets For Prescription
Emergency Contraception, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/ucm222428.htm (last updated Apr. 22, 2013) (last visited
Sept. 15, 2013) (approving Ella) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
103. Infra notes 104–15. Other plaintiffs challenging the contraception
mandate oppose all contraception. This Article focuses solely on the subset of
plaintiffs who object to abortion but not contraception.
104. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120, 1125
(10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (No. 13-354) (arguing that
the contraception mandate forces them to facilitate abortion in violation of
religious beliefs); Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377,
381–82 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (No. 13-354) (same);
Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (D. Colo. 2013) (same); Sharpe
Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 2:12–CV–92–DDN,
2012 WL 6738489, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2012) (same); Am. Pulverizer Co. v.
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The lawsuits allege that the contraception mandate imposes
a substantial burden on the employers’ religious conscience and
violates both the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.105 Sometimes the corporate owners claim that
the requirements burden their own conscience.106 However, aware
that the mandate does not require them individually but rather
their legally distinct companies to fund the health insurance
plans, oftentimes they claim that the mandate burdens the
religious conscience of their for-profit corporations.107 This is a
novel religious liberty claim: Never before have for-profit
corporations claimed to have free exercise rights.108
These challenges have already resulted in a circuit split, with
some appellate courts accepting the argument that the
contraception mandate burdens the religious conscience of forprofit corporations.109 For plaintiffs like Hobby Lobby Stores, this
outcome depends on two distortions. First, the court must accept
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 12–3459–CV–S–RED, 2012 WL
6951316, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012) (same); O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1159 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (same).
105. See supra note 104 (citing relevant cases).
106. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 381–82 (arguing that
the contraception mandate violated the religious liberty of owners of a for-profit
corporation); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2013) (same);
Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (same); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 620–21 (6th Cir. 2013)
(same).
107. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 381 (describing
plaintiffs’ argument that the contraception mandate burdened religious liberty
of the for-profit corporation); Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1122 (same);
Korte, 735 F.3d at 658 (same); Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1210 (same); Autocam Corp.,
730 F.3d at 621 (same).
108. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643
(2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has never addressed whether for-profit
corporations can assert religious liberty claims).
109. Compare Korte, 735 F.3d at 687 (holding that the contraception
mandate violates for-profit corporations religious rights under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act), and Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1126,
1128–29 (holding that a for-profit corporation has free exercise rights and that a
for-profit corporation is a “person” under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act), with Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 621 (holding for profit corporation was not
a person who could bring a religious liberty claim), and Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 384, 388 (holding that for-profit corporations do
not have free exercise rights and have no protection under Religious Freedom
Restoration Act).
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the erroneous claim that Plan B and Ella are abortifacients.
Second, the Free Exercise Clause, designed to protect religious
individuals and their religious associations, must be distorted to
reach for-profit corporations. While the Supreme Court has not
yet ruled on the issue of corporate religious liberty—although it
has granted certiorari—the abortion context raises the possibility
in a way other contexts would not.110
A. The Scientific Distortion
Several lawsuits have been filed by owners who are not
religiously opposed to contraception but are vehemently opposed
to abortion. These plaintiffs believe that life begins at fertilization
and that killing an embryo is a sin:111 “[T]he life of a distinct
human person begins at fertilization and . . . the grave wrong of
abortion includes intentionally preventing the embryo’s
implantation.”112 For them, abortion is “an intrinsic evil and a sin
against God.”113 Given that abortion is “the moral equivalent of
homicide,”114 they do not want their company’s health insurance
plan to provide Plan B or Ella on the grounds that they “are
widely known as abortifacients in that they frequently function to
110. See Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678, 678 (2013)
(“Petition for writ of certiorari . . . granted.”).
111. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120–22 (10th
Cir. 2013); Verified Complaint at 12, Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109
(D. Colo. 2013) (No. 13–cv–00285–WYD–BNB) (“One of the religious and moral
teachings which Mr. Briscoe embraces, based on the Holy Bible, is that a
preborn child is, from the moment of conception, i.e., a fertilized embryo, a
human being created in the image of God.”).
112. Brief for Bart Stupak and Democrats for Life of America at 15, as Amici
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs/Appellees & Supporting Affirmance, Newland v.
Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 1:12–cv–1123–JLK); see also
Complaint at 5, Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No.
12–3459–CV–S–RED, 2012 WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012) (“As
evangelical Christians, Plaintiffs believe in the sanctity of human life from the
moment of conception.”).
113. Verified Complaint at 12, Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D.
Colo. 2013) (No. 13–cv–00285–WYD–BNB).
114. Pam Belluck, Abortion Qualms on Morning-After Pill May Be
Unfounded, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, at A1 (quoting Dr. Donna Harrison,
Director of Research, American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and
Gynecologists).
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destroy fertilized eggs, which Plaintiffs consider to be abortion on
demand.” 115
They are wrong. An abortifacient ends a pregnancy.116 These
drugs do not end a pregnancy. In order to understand why, it is
helpful to review some basic biology. Many people erroneously
believe that pregnancy occurs immediately after sexual
intercourse, and therefore any measure taken after intercourse
works to end a pregnancy. That is not actually how our bodies
work. While the lifespan of an egg does not exceed twenty-four
hours, sperm can survive for five days.117 Consequently, a woman
can ovulate up to five days after sex and become pregnant.118 In
other words, there is plenty of time between sex and fertilization.
Strictly speaking, pregnancy does not begin until a fertilized
egg implants in the uterus.119 That is, the medical community
does not consider a pregnancy to begin when the sperm fuses
115. Complaint at 3, Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 2:12–CV–92–DDN, 2012 WL 6738489 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2012); see
also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120–21 (10th Cir.
2013) (“[T]hese services are drugs and devices that the plaintiffs believe to be
abortifacients, the use of which is contrary to their faith.”); Verified Complaint
at 3, Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Colo. 2013) (No. 13–cv–
00285–WYD–BNB)
In the category of “FDA-approved contraceptives” included in this
HHS mandate are several drugs or devices that may cause the demise
of an already-conceived but not-yet-implanted human embryo, such
as [Plan B and Ella] which studies show can function to kill embryos
even after they have implanted in the uterus, by a mechanism similar
to the abortion drug RU-486.
Complaint at 5, Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
No. 12–3459–CV–S–RED, 2012 WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012)
(“Plaintiffs consider [Plan B and Ella] to be the equivalent of early abortions.”).
116. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 6 (1993) (defining abortifacient as “a drug or other agent that induces
abortion”).
117. See Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson, Review Article: Emergency
Contraception—Mechanisms of Action, 87 CONTRACEPTION 300, 301 (2013)
(“[S]permatozoa can survive in the female reproductive tract for 5–6 days after
intercourse.”).
118. See Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson & Chun-Xia Meng, Emergency
Contraception: Potential Role of Ulipristal Acetate, 2 INT’L J. OF WOMEN’S
HEALTH 53, 55 (2010) (explaining that unprotected sex may result in pregnancy
“from 5 days before to 1 day after ovulation”).
119. See Rachel Benson Gold, The Implications of Defining When a Woman
Is Pregnant, 8 GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 7, 7–8 (2005) (explaining the
medical definition of pregnancy).
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with the egg and creates the single-celled zygote.120 Rather,
textbook biology is that pregnancy starts several days later, once
the fertilized egg travels down the fallopian tube, starts to divide,
and successfully embeds itself into the lining of the woman’s
uterus.121 Notably, less than one half of fertilized eggs complete
this process.122
Even relying on the alternate understanding of “pregnancy”
(pregnancy at fertilization vs. pregnancy at implantation),
neither Plan B nor Ella work in the way the plaintiffs think the
medicine works. In other words, even assuming pregnancy began
at fertilization, morning-after pills do not stop implantation or
120. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG),
Statement on Contraceptive Methods (July 1998); see also Gold, supra note 119,
at 7 (“[M]edical experts—notably the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG)—agree that the establishment of a pregnancy takes
several days and is not completed until a fertilized egg is implanted in the lining
of a woman’s uterus.”). A poll of American obstetrician–gynecologists showing
that fifty-seven percent believe that pregnancy starts at “conception” does not
prove otherwise. See Grace S. Chung et al., Obstetrician–Gynecologists’ Beliefs
About When Pregnancy Begins, 206 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 132.e1,
132.e1 (2012) (describing poll). Why not? Ninety-two percent of those polled
belong to ACOG, and, as the study itself acknowledged, ACOG equates
“conception” with implantation. Id. at 132.e3, 132e5; E-mail from Elizabeth
Sepper, Assoc. Professor of Law, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Oct. 23,
2013) (on file with author).
121. An amicus brief signed by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, Physicians for Reproductive Health, Association of Reproductive
Health Professionals, American Society for Reproductive Medicine, and
American Women’s Medical Association, among others, states that “[p]regnancy
is established only upon conclusion of such implantation.” Brief for Physicians
for Reprod. Health et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12, Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (Oct. 21, 2013), cert. granted, 134
S. Ct. 678 (U.S. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13–354) [hereinafter ACOG Amicus Brief].
The ACOG Amicus Brief also notes that “[t]he scientific definition of pregnancy
is also the legal definition of pregnancy, accepted by governmental agencies and
all major U.S. medical organizations.”. Id. at 13; see also, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.202
(2013) (recognizing pregnancy as “the period of time from implantation to
delivery”).
122. See Stephen S. Hall, The Good Egg, DISCOVER MAG., May 26, 2004, at
30, 30–39 (“John Opitz, a professor of pediatrics, human genetics, and obstetrics
and gynecology at the University of Utah, told the President’s Council on
Bioethics last September that preimplantation embryo loss is ‘enormous.’
Estimates range all the way from 60 percent to 80 percent.”); K. Diedrich et al.,
The Role of the Endometrium and Embryo in Human Implantation, 13 HUMAN
REPROD. UPDATE 365, 366 (2007) (noting that even under optimal conditions, no
more than 40% of blastocysts implant).
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kill fertilized eggs. The evidence is particularly conclusive for
Plan B (active ingredient levonorgestrel), which has been around
longer and studied in more depth than Ella (active ingredient
ulipristal acetate).
Every reputable scientific study to examine Plan B’s
mechanism has concluded that these pills prevent fertilization
from occurring in the first place.123 In their press release
announcing that Plan B would be made available over the
counter with no age restrictions, the FDA explained that “[t]he
product contains higher levels of a hormone found in some types
of daily use oral hormonal contraceptive pills and works in a
similar way to these contraceptive pills by stopping ovulation and
therefore preventing pregnancy.”124 In short, Plan B is
contraception.
To be fair, when it first approved the drug, the FDA did
require Plan B labels to mention the possibility that they
prevented implantation.125 At the time, the scientific studies
focused on whether the drugs prevented pregnancy rather than
on how they prevented pregnancy.126 The label reflected that
uncertainty, noting that the drug “could theoretically prevent
123. See, e.g., INT’L FED’N OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS (FIGO) & INT’L
CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION, MECHANISM OF ACTION: HOW DO
LEVONORGESTREL-ONLY EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION PILLS (LNG ECPS) PREVENT
PREGNANCY 1–2 (2012), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/health/
contraception/ICEC_FIGO_MoA_Statement_March_2012.pdf [hereinafter FIGO
SUMMARY] (summarizing studies). Indeed, this fact explains why EC is not 100%
effective in preventing pregnancy, and why it becomes less effective the later it
is taken. Id.; see also Julie Rovner, Morning-After Pills Don’t Cause Abortions,
Studies Say, NPR.ORG (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
health/2013/02/22/172595689/morning-after-pills-dont-cause-abortion-studiessay (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) (“[T]here is now fairly definitive research that
shows the only way [Plan B] works is by preventing ovulation, and therefore,
fertilization.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
124. FDA News Release: FDA Approves Plan B One Step Emergency
Contraceptive for Use Without a Prescription for All Women of Child-Bearing
Potential,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnounce
ments/ucm358082.htm (last updated June 21, 2013) (last visited Jan. 18, 2014)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
125. See ACOG Amicus Brief, supra note 121, at 16 (noting that “[t]he
product label has not been updated since the product was originally approved in
1999 and it does not reflect the most current research”); Belluck, supra note 114,
at A1 (“Labels inside every box of morning-after pills . . . say they may work by
blocking fertilized eggs from implanting in a woman’s uterus.”).
126. Belluck, supra note 114, at A1.
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pregnancy by interfering with a number of physiological
processes”
including
“interfering
with
ovulation
or
implantation.”127 The possibility was not supported by any
particular study.128 Again, the mechanism was still not quite
clear.129
However, studies conducted since then have established that
these pills work by preventing ovulation. In one study, for
example, women who took Plan B before ovulation did not
became pregnant, while women who took Plan B after ovulation
became pregnant at the same rates as they would have without
any medicine.130 Summarizing the most recent research on
levonorgestrel-only emergency contraception like Plan B,131 the
International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics (FIGO)
127. Id.
128. See id. (“A New York Times review of hundreds of pages of approval
process documents found no discussion of evidence supporting implantation
effects.”); Sandra E. Reznik, Plan B: How It Works, 91 HEALTH PROGRESS 59, 61
(2010) (“There are absolutely no data to support [the package’s] statement
[regarding implantation].”).
129. Cf. Kevin Clarke, The Emergency Contraception Question, AMERICA:
NAT’L CATH. REV., http://americamagazine.org/issue/emergency-contraceptionquestion (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) (quoting Erica V. Jefferson, an FDA public
affairs deputy director, as noting “[i]t is often difficult at the time the drug is
approved or even afterwards to pinpoint the mechanism of action of the drug”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Experts speculated that
there might have been two reasons why the possibility was included. One, daily
birth control pills can alter the lining of the uterus, and some of them share the
active ingredient of Plan B. Belluck, supra note 114, at A1. Two, “[i]mplantation
also likely wound up on the label because of what [researcher] Dr. GemzellDaniellsson called wishful thinking by some scientists, who thought that if it
could also block implantation, it would be even better at preventing pregnancy.”
Id.
130. See FIGO SUMMARY, supra note 123 (describing studies); Catholic
Journal Says Plan B Does Not Cause Abortions, NAT’L CATH. REP.,
http://ncronline.org/print/news/catholic-journal-says-plan-b-does-not-causeabortions (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) (“[S]ince it takes about a week from an
egg’s fertilization to its implantation, the scientific evidence that Plan B
treatment is completely ineffective after five days is overwhelming: It works
only by preventing fertilization, not by preventing implantation.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
131. Besides Plan B, other levonorgestrel-only emergency contraception pills
available in the United States include the generics Next Choice One Dose and
My Way. See JAMES TRUSSELL & ELIZABETH G. RAYMOND, EMERGENCY
CONTRACEPTION: A LAST CHANCE TO PREVENT UNINTENDED PREGNANCY 2 (2013),
http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ec-review.pdf (noting two generic forms of Plan
B approved in 2012).
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reported in 2012 that this emergency contraception works prefertilization.132 In particular, “[t]he evidence shows that” Plan B
pills “[i]mpair ovulation,”133 “may affect sperm,”134 but “do not
inhibit implantation.”135 The National Institutes of Health and
the Mayo Clinic have both updated their website to reflect the
same conclusion.136 FIGO concludes that Plan B inhibits or delays
ovulation and that “[Plan B] cannot prevent implantation of a
fertilized egg. Language on implantation should not be included

132. FIGO SUMMARY, supra note 123; see also Reznik, supra note 128, at 59
(“Unlike its predecessors . . . leveonorgesterel acts to prevent pregnancy before,
and only before, fertilization occurs.”).
133. FIGO SUMMARY, supra note 123, at 1; see also id. (“A number of studies
provide strong direct evidence that LNG ECP prevent or delay ovulation. If
taken before ovulation, LNG ECP inhibit the pre-ovatory luteinizing hormone
(LH) surge, impeding follicular development and maturation and/or release of
the egg itself. This is the primary mechanism of action.”); Reznik, supra note
128, at 59 (“Studies have shown that Plan B suppresses the hypothalamus and
pituitary glands and thereby wipes out the so-called luteinizing hormone surge.
Without that hormonal surge, ovulation does not occur.”).
134. See FIGO SUMMARY, supra note 123, at 1
Contradictory results exist regarding whether LNG taken postcoitally and in doses used for EC affects sperm function. Early studies
suggested that LNG ECPs interfere with sperm motility by
thickening cervical mucus. However, two in vitro studies found that
LNG in doses used for EC had no direct effect on sperm.
135. See id.
[In two studies], no pregnancies occurred in the women who took
ECP’s before ovulation; while pregnancies occurred only in women
who took ECPs on or after the day of ovulation, providing evidence
that ECPs were unable to prevent implantation . . . . Most studies
show that LNG ECPs have no [histological or biochemical] effect on
the endometrium, indicating that they have no mechanism to prevent
implantation. One study showed that levonogestrel did not prevent
the attachment of human embryos to a simulated (in vitro)
endometrial environment. Animal studies demonstrated that LNG
ECPs did not prevent implantation of the fertilized egg in the
endometrium.
Reznik, supra note 128, at 60–61 (“[B]iological experiments involving both
animal and human tissue show Plan B has no effect on the endometrium that
would be compatible with decreased receptivity for implantation.”).
136. Ruth Moon, Does Plan B Cause Abortions, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, May
2013, at 15; Pam Belluck, New Birth Control Label Counters Lawsuit Claim,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013, at A17.
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in [its] product labeling.”137 Indeed, it is no longer on the label in
Europe.138
In sum, the scientific consensus is that Plan B does not cause
an abortion under anyone’s definition of pregnancy.139 Although
there are fewer studies on Ella, the newest research points to the
same conclusion.140 Ella seems to be more effective than Plan B,
leading some to speculate as to abortifacient qualities.141
Published studies, however, have established that Ella’s
increased effectiveness is due to its greater ability to prevent
ovulation. Once the lutenizing hormone (LH) that triggers
ovulation starts to surge, which occurs roughly one to two days
before ovulation,142 Plan B is no longer able to forestall
ovulation.143 In contrast, Ella can prevent or postpone ovulation
even after the LH rise begins.144 In short, “the best available
137. FIGO SUMMARY, supra note 123.
138. See Belluck, supra note 136, at A17 (reporting that European health
officials have changed labels for the European equivalent of Plan B to clarify
that the pill “cannot stop a fertilized egg from attaching to the womb”).
139. Supra notes 116–35 and accompanying text.
140. Infra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Ralph P. Miech, Immunopharmacology of Ulipristal as an
Emergency Contraception, 3 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 391, 391–94 (2011)
(presenting commentary to American Association of the Pro-Life Obstetricians
and Gynecologists).
142. Joseph B. Stanford et al., Timing Intercourse to Achieve Pregnancy:
Current Evidence, 100 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1333, 1337 (2002).
143. See CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., ETHICAL CURRENTS: ELLA
(ULIPRISTAL ACETATE): TAKING ANOTHER LOOK 17–20 (2012), http://www.
chausa.org/docs/default-source/general-files/6454ef88fd7c45af903d85a0ce3f1f81
1-pdf.pdf (describing studies that indicate that Ella prevents ovulation in a
greater percentage of women than Plan B).
144. See, e.g., ACOG Amicus Brief, supra note 121, at 21
[W]hile [Plan B] is effective at preventing ovulation only when taken
before the LH surge, [Ella] is still effective at preventing pregnancy
even when taken after the LH surge has begun, but before the LH
peak. . . . Although [Ella] has a wider window of effectiveness than
[Plan B], it still does not prevent release of the egg, and therefore, is
not effective . . . after the peak of the LH surge.
Vivian Brache et al., Ulipristal Acetate Prevents Ovulation More Effectively
Than Levonorgestrel: Analysis of Pooled Data Three Randomized Trials of
Emergency Contraception Regimens, 88 CONTRACEPTION 611, 616–17 (2013)
(“[Ella] is the most effective treatment, delaying ovulation for at least 5 days in
59% of the cycles.”); Gemzell-Danielsson, supra note 117, at 305 (“The window of
action of [Ella] seems wider than that for [Plan B] since it may, in addition,
prevent an ovulation after LH has started to rise.”).
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evidence is that the ability of levonorgestrel [Plan B] and
ulipristal acetate ECPs [Ella] to prevent pregnancy can be fully
accounted for by mechanisms that do not involve interference
with post-fertilization events.”145
Courts that actually take the time to examine the underlying
science recognize this scientific conclusion. In his decision
ordering that Plan B be made available to women of all ages,
Judge Korman found that “[t]hese contraceptives have not been
shown to cause a postfertilization event—a change in the uterus
that could interfere with implantation of a fertilized egg.”146 Prolife scientists who have studied the evidence likewise agree. So
for example, one pro-life researcher, after noting that “[t]here’s no
evidence [that Plan B prevents implantation],” stated that “[o]ur
claims of conscience should be based on scientific fact, and we
should be willing to change our claims if facts change.”147
145. TRUSSELL & RAYMOND, supra note 131, at 7. A brief submitted on behalf
of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and several other
medical groups agreed: “As established by the weight of the evidence, LNG
[Plan B] and UPA [Ella] function primarily, if not exclusively, by inhibiting
ovulation, thereby preventing fertilization from occurring . . . . [T]here is no
evidence that [Ella] affects implantation.” ACOG Amicus Brief, supra note 121,
at 15–16; see also Gemzell-Danielsson et al., supra note 117, at 305 (“In
conclusion, EC with a single dose of 1.5 mg LNG [Plan B] or 30 mg UPA [Ella]
acts through inhibition of or postponing ovulation but does not prevent
fertilization or implantation and has no adverse effect on a pregnancy.”).
146. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-109, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION: DECISION PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR OVER-THECOUNTER MARKETING OF THE EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG PLAN B WAS
UNUSUAL 13 (2005)); see also id. (“Indeed, Diana Blithe, the biochemist who
supervises research on contraception at the National Institutes of Health
(“NIH”), opined that the possibility of levonorgestrel-based emergency
contraceptives having an effect on implantation of fertilized eggs should
‘definitely’ be taken off the labels for those drugs.”); Reznik, supra note 128, at
59 (noting that studies indicated no evidence that Plan B “decreased
receptiveness to implantation”).
147. Moon, supra note 136, at 15; see also Clarke, supra note 129
(“[M]ounting evidence [shows] that levonorgestrel [a Plan B generic] has little or
no effect on post-fertilization events. In other words, given the limitation of
scientific certitude, they suggest that Plan B, when administered once, is not an
abortifacient.”); Fernando Saravi, Comment to Article, Does Plan B Cause
Abortions?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.christianity
today.com/ct/channel/comments/allreviews.html?id=104071&type=article (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014)
I am a professor of physiology who has reviewed ALL the available
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While the courts cannot and should not question plaintiffs’
religious beliefs, the courts can and should question the accuracy
of their science. Plaintiffs’ opposition is based on a medical
mistake. They are religiously opposed to killing fertilized eggs.
Neither Plan B nor Ella kills fertilized eggs. Courts should not be
deferential when they encounter obvious scientific error,148 and
plaintiffs’ claims regarding morning after pills should have been
dismissed.149 To paraphrase a well-known quip, “everyone is
entitled to his own [religious beliefs], but not his own facts.”150
B. The First Amendment Distortion
The First Amendment distortions in this line of cases are not
as obvious as in Part II, where courts have simply failed to apply
free speech doctrine altogether. Instead, the key distortion here is
that courts are much more willing to entertain the possibility of a
free exercise violation than current jurisprudence supports. That
is, instead of affording insufficient First Amendment protection
(to those challenging limits on reproductive rights), the courts are
awarding too much First Amendment protection (to those
evidence on levoneorgestrel [sic] used as emergency contraception
(EC). It has become clear that there is no evidence that this drug,as
[sic] used for EC, may avoid or inhibit implantation. This is plain
scientific evaluation; I’m an Evangelical Christian with a strong
stance against abortion in any form. Of course, I do have moral issues
regarding the whole EC concept itself.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. See Imani Gandy, Plan B and Ella are Not Abortifacients, But False
Claims May Hold Up in Court, RH REALITY CHECK (Mar. 27, 2013 8:50 AM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/03/27/plan-b-and-ella-are-notabortifacients-but-false-claims-may-hold-up-in-court/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014)
(“People are entitled to believe all sorts of things and courts can’t question that.
That doesn’t make those beliefs correct, and that certainly doesn’t mean that
those beliefs must be given the force of law.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
149. See id. (“Either something is an abortifacient or it isn’t. The pill, Plan
B, and Ella aren’t. That should be the end of the discussion.”).
150. See CHARLES G. KOCH, THE SCIENCE OF SUCCESS: HOW MARKET-BASED
MANAGEMENT BUILT THE WORLD’S LARGEST PRIVATE COMPANY 31 (2007) (“As
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan put it: ‘Everyone is entitled to his own
opinion, but not his own facts.’”); cf. Gandy, supra note 148 (“Plaintiffs in these
lawsuits are demanding their ‘religious belief’ in false information and junk
science be used to trump the rights of others.”).
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challenging access to reproductive rights). In particular, I would
argue that they are willing to extend religious liberty protection
in novel ways in part because of the reproductive rights backdrop.
That is, I do not think these challenges, especially the claim that
for-profit corporations are entitled to a religious exemption from
the contraception mandate, would have gotten as much traction
in a different context. But because they arise in the context of
abortion—well, the rules work differently.
A threshold issue in these cases is whether for-profit
corporations even have religious liberty rights. Whether for-profit
corporations are rights-holders under the Free Exercise Clause or
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) is a question of
first impression.151 Existing religion clause jurisprudence would
suggest not.152 Nonetheless, courts ruling on contraception
mandate challenges have been divided in their answer.153 My
main point is not that for-profit corporations are not entitled to
religious exemptions—although they really are not.154 Rather, my
point is that courts are much more likely to accept this novel
proposition when made in the abortion context.
A counterfactual example might help make this clear.
Imagine a family-owned company, let’s call it Hobby Bobby,
which employs thirteen thousand full-time workers.155 Hobby
Bobby owns hundreds of stores that sell arts and crafts
supplies.156 The company is a for-profit corporation.157 As a
corporation, it enjoys benefits such as limited liability for its
owners. Actually, the family does not directly own shares in the
company. Instead, the company is in a trust with the family
members as beneficiaries of the trust.158 The family members all
belong to a religion with very strong precepts against killing
151. Supra note 108 and accompanying text.
152. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty (Oct.
23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing the issue in greater detail) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
153. See supra note 109 (describing circuit split).
154. See generally Corbin, supra note 152.
155. Cf. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir.
2013).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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animals. A new federal law mandates that companies with over
fifty full-time employees provide comprehensive health
insurance.159 Grandfathered plans are exempted,160 but most are
expected to soon be extinct.161 Thanks to the new law, Hobby
Bobby’s employees may receive, without cost-sharing, preventive
medications, including cholesterol-lowering drugs.162 The family,
however, objects because they believe the cholesterol medicine
might be made with animal by-products. (In fact, they are wrong
about the cholesterol drugs.) They claim that it violates their
corporation’s religious rights and their own individual religious
rights for Hobby Bobby to provide employees health care
insurance that covers these drugs.163
I suspect that courts would not be as receptive to these
claims as courts have been to the contraception mandate ones.
Perhaps I am wrong, but it seems unlikely that the courts would
ignore an amicus brief filed by the American Heart Association
that the drugs do not, in fact, contain animal by-products,164 and
that consequently there is no clash between any religious and
legal obligations. Nor do I see courts undertaking the doctrinal
and theoretical contortions necessary to conclude that for-profit
corporations have a religious right not to provide cholesterol–
lowering medicine.165 Finally, it is hard to picture courts ruling
that a person’s individual religious liberty is implicated when the
corporation which is owned by a trust of which she is a
beneficiary must include in its insurance plan cholesterol
medication she (erroneously) opposes on religious grounds.
159. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2) (2012).
160. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1251, 124 Stat. 119, 162
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2012)).
161. Infra note 168.
162. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2713(a)(4), 124 Stat. at
131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)-(c) (2012)).
163. An analogous thought experiment can be done with owners whose
religion opposes psychiatry or other widespread medical care.
164. Cf. ACOG Amicus Brief, supra note 121 (explaining that morning-after
pills work by preventing ovulation).
165. It also seems less likely that the courts would conclude that the state
government lacks a compelling interest in people’s health because of exceptions
to the law, see, for example, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc v. Sebelius, 722 F.3d 1114,
1143 (10th Cir. 2013), or that the law is not narrowly tailored because the
government could provide these medicines instead, see, for example, Korte v.
Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 686 (7th Cir. 2013).
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Of course, the doctrinal analysis has also been distorted in
various ways. In order to conclude that the contraception
mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, for
example, a court must find that the mandate substantially
burdens plaintiffs’ religious conscience, and that the law fails
strict scrutiny.166 As discussed above, the claim that morningafter pills substantially burden those opposed to abortion should
have been dismissed out of hand. The pills are contraception, not
abortifacients.
Or take, for example, the claim that the contraception
mandate cannot advance a compelling state interest because it
does not protect all employees.167 If the mandate’s goals were
truly compelling, the argument goes, there would be no (or at
least fewer) exceptions; the current law, however, grandfathers
certain existing health care plans168 and exempts employers with
fewer than fifty employees.169 Accordingly, the law fails strict
scrutiny. But if that were the rule—that a law cannot be deemed
to advance a compelling interest unless its reach is essentially
all-inclusive—then Title VII, which applies only to employers
with fifteen or more full-time employees,170 does not advance a
compelling state interest. After all, it does not protect all
employees from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin.171 In fact, the first year it was
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (describing requirements for a
successful RFRA claim).
167. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d at 1143 (concluding that
providing access to free contraception was not a compelling state interest
because law countenanced exceptions for small and grandfathered companies).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (describing grandfathered plans). Grandfathered
plans are those that existed on March 23, 2010, and have not substantially
changed by either cutting benefits or increasing out of pocket expenses. See
What If I Have a Grandfathered Insurance Plan?, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/what-if-i-have-a-grandfathered-health-plan/
(last
visited Jan. 18, 2014) (defining grandfathered plans) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). A survey of American companies conducted
in 2010 found that ninety percent of large businesses expected to lose their
grandfathered status by 2014. See Jerry Geisel, Most Health Plans to Lose
Grandfathered Status: Survey, BUS. INS. (Aug. 10, 2010, 11:05 AM),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20100810/NEWS/100819995#
(last
visited Jan. 18, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
169. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2) (defining applicable large employer).
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining employer).
171. Infra note 172 and accompanying text.
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implemented, Title VII applied only to employers with one
hundred or more full-time employees, with the number lowered
each successive year until it reached twenty-five or more
employees in its fourth year.172 Even today, more than eighty
percent of employers are too small to be covered by Title VII.173
Despite Title VII’s incomplete coverage, it is hard to imagine that
a court would conclude that ending race discrimination in
employment was not a compelling state interest, and even harder
to imagine that courts would contemplate exempting on religious
grounds a racially discriminatory for-profit corporation.174
Somehow, though, this reasoning becomes plausible in the
context of women and their reproductive rights.175
In short, it is probably not an accident that the question of
corporate religious liberty has presented itself in a women’s
reproductive rights case, as the proposition would probably not
have gotten as much traction if a business enterprise were
challenging cholesterol medicine, or simply a different employee
insurance program.

172. See Milestones in EEOC History: 1965, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1965.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) (“In its first
year, Title VII applies to employers with 100 or more employees, with coverage
phased in over the next three years to reach employers with as few as 25 or
more employees.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The law
was subsequently amended to cover employers with fifteen or more full-time
employees in 1972.
173. According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, 4,902,520 out of
5,684,424 employer firms (86.2%) had fewer than fifteen employees in 2011. See
Robert Jay Dilger, Small Business Size Standards: A Historical Analysis of
Contemporary Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 3 (Jan. 3, 2014)
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40860.pdf (noting that 79.3% of employer
firms had fewer than ten employees and 89.8% of employer firms had fewer
than twenty).
174. Indeed, the Court has even rejected the free exercise claim of a
nonprofit school seeking an exemption from anti-discrimination law on the
grounds that the states interest in ending race discrimination was a compelling
state interest. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983)
(“The governmental interest at stake here is compelling.”).
175. One would have also thought that it was no longer open to question
whether eliminating sex discrimination was a compelling state interest. See
Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1469,
1479–83 (2013) (discussing sex equality as a compelling state interest).
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IV. Conclusion

Abortion exceptionalism means the rules are different for
abortion cases. Instead of rejecting baseless scientific claims,
courts rely on them. Instead of applying existing First
Amendment jurisprudence, courts ignore fundamental principles
or distort them beyond recognition. Consequently, false claims
about abortion have justified mandatory counseling laws, and
mistaken claims about morning-after pills have allowed for-profit
corporations to avoid the contraception mandate. These
distortions not only impede women’s reproductive rights but also
result in highly problematic precedents. Indeed, the willingness
to bend the rules when it comes to abortion may result in a
jurisprudence where for-profit corporations are entitled to
religious exemptions, even when the exemption burdens the
corporation’s (whole, separate, unique living human being)
employees.

